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CAUSE AND CONSIDERATION IN THE QUEBEC
CIVIL CODE
In Quebec, as is well known, our common law is French, just
as the common law of South Africa is Roman-Dutch, and to much
the same extent. But whereas in South Africa the law is uncodi-
fled and must be collected from numerous works of authority in
Dutch and Latin extending from the 16th to the beginning of
the I9 th century, in Quebec on the other hand we have a Civil
Code, which came into force on the ist of August, 1866. In
form it is framed upon the same general plan as the Code
Napol6on. In substance it reproduces with some modifications
and additions pre-existing law, which rested ultimately upon
French customary law, but which had also been influenced at
several points by the law of England.
This brief explanation may serve as introduction to the subject
of this paper.
Amongst the fundamental questions which every legal .system
must answer is that of the distinction between agreements and
contracts. A contract is an agreement enforceable at law. Yes.
But what is the test of enforceability? Assume the intention to
contract, a lawful object, an agreement unaffected by fraud, etc.,
parties capable of contracting-is that enough, or is something
more wanted to raise the agreement to the rank of contract? To
this question both English law and French law answer that some-
thing more is wanted. English law requires 'consideration.'
French law requires 'cause.! Quebec law, to avoid a quarrel
upon so abstract an issue, demands one or other or both. The
accommodating language of the Code seems intended by confusing
the issue to conceal the antagonism between the two ideas.
The Civil Code exists in a French and in an English version.
Since neither is more authentic than the other, I shall quote from
the English version.
The third Title of the third Book treats of Obligations.
Under the caption General Provisions two preliminary articles
declare :-Art. 982. "It is essential to an obligation that it should
have a cause from which it arises"; and art. 983. "Obligations
arise from contracts, quasi-contracts, offences, quasi-offences, and
from the operation of the law solely." The language of these
articles, which is taken almost verbatim from Pothier, certainly
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savours of the lecture room. But it is unambiguous. It simply
means that obligations arise in various ways and from various
sources. This, however, is not the sense of the word 'cause'
which concerns us. There is a more technical use of the word,
which we find in later paragraphs.
Following the scheme outlined in art. 983 the codifiers proceed
to: Chapter First-Of Contracts. Section I. Of the Requi-
sites to the Validity of Contracts; which art. 984 declares to
be four--"Parties legally capable of contracting; their consent
legally given; something which forms the object of the contract;
a lawful cause or consideration." The last requirement is devel-
oped a little lower down in a sub-section headed Of the Cause
or Consideration of Contracts, which contains two articles,
viz., art. 989. "A contract without a consideration, or with an
unlawful consideration has no effect; but it is not the less valid
though the consideration be not expressed or be incorrectly
expressed in the writing which is evidence of the contract." . •
Art. 990. "The consideration is unlawful when it is prohibited by
law or is contrary to good morals or public order." . . . It will
be noticed that while art. 984 speaks of 'cause or consideration,'
arts. 989-990 speak of 'consideration' alone; but they are sub-
stantially the same as arts. 11o8, 1131, 1133 of the Code Napoleon,
in which the corresponding word is 'cause.'
It was part of the instructions of the Commissioners who
framed our Code that they should first of all codify the existing
law, and that proposed amendments should be embodied in sepa-
rate articles. The Commissioners were further directed in
stating the old law to cite the authorities for each article of their
draft. Numerous authorities are annexed to the three articles
just cited. The references are to the Roman law, or to Pothier
and other French writers. There is no reference to the law of
England.
Now, the French law (perhaps I should say the French law-
yers) had a doctrine of cause, not very coherent, perhaps, but
sui generis. The English law had its doctrine of consideration,
which, whatever its origin, by the middle of the last century had
run its own course for fully three hundred years. It was not
then-it never had been-the same as the French doctrine of
cause. But the codifiers speak of 'cause or consideration' as if
the two conceptions were identical. How to explain the identifi-
cation? Is it a stroke of political legerdemain? or did they really
not know the difference? or are the two things not so different
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as they seem? or have we in Quebec invented a hybrid thing
which is neither 'cause' nor 'consideration' but partakes of the
nature of both? Certainly the codifiers may be acquitted of any
conscious intention to change the law. Had such been their pur-
pose it would have been indicated in the manner prescribed to
them. The fact is that the identification of cause and consider-
ation had been made before the date of the Code-how long
before I cannot say. A probable explanation is that English-
trained lawyers happening upon the French doctrine of cause
assumed its identity with consideration, while French lawyers in
like manner assumed that consideration was the same as cause.
There resulted an entente of expression and, perhaps, a real fusion
of ideas, which we find perpetuated in the ambiguous language of
the Code.
Doubtless cause and consideration have something in common.
They may be off-shoots from the same stock. The word cause
is met with in Roman law in many separate contexts. The diffi-
culty is to ascertain how far in each case the word is a term of
art. In relation to contract the best established use of the word
seems to be in connection with the innominate real contracts (do
ut des, etc.) in which the prestation on one side is represented
as the cause of the obligation on the other. By parity of reason-
ing the delivery of the res in the four nominate real contracts-
mutuum, depositum, commodatum, pignus-may be regarded,
though this is not to be found in the texts, as the 'cause' in each
case of the obligation of the deliveree. So far, the use of the
word seems free from objection. But modern civilians depart
from the analogy of the Roman law by inventing a 'cause' for
the consensual contracts as well. This they find not in a neces-
sary antecedent, but in an invariable concomitant. Thus the
cause of the obligation of the buyer to pay the price is found in
the obligation of the seller to deliver the thing sold, or, as they
also put it, the cause of the one obligation is the object or con-
tent of the other. In thus extending the scope of the word
'cause' the jurists have distorted it from its proper meaning. It
becomes not the cause of the obligation, but the object, the advan-
tage, which the obligor proposes to himself as the equivalent of
his undertaking-le but iinm6diat en vue duquel le d6biteur a
consenti s'obliger-in other words, the quid pro quo, the
consideration.
We seem, then, to see the two doctrines converging to a point.
Where there is executed performance, or promise for promise,
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what figures as cause in the one system figures equally as consid-
eration in the other. But here the resemblance ends. The
French law of France recognises under the name of conti-ats de
bienfaisance a third class of contracts in which the giving is all
on one side, the receiving all on the other. Hereupon the com-
mentators, while protesting that cause is not the same as motive,
find a cause in the anticipated happiness of the object of the
bounty or in the mental satisfaction, which is supposed to reward
the doer of a generous act. But if this is not motive, language
has no meaning. So we get a third application of the word
'cause' differing from the first two. Of course, we may use the
word cause to mean anything we please. It need not have any
more to do with causation than consideration has to do with
considering. But if there is to be a "theory of cause," the word
must have a stable value and must express a single idea. This
however, as expounded by the commentators upon the French
law, it does not. I find it impossible to resist Professor Planiol's
conclusion that the different classes of 'cause' cannot by any
ingenuity be referred to a single principle, "Les auteurs
modernes ont beaucoup travaill6 pour trouver une d6finition
g6n&ale de la cause. . . . Leurs efforts ont 6t6 yains; la raison
est la multiplicit6 des notions comprises sur le nom de cause; A
ce qui est het&og-ne, il est impossible de donner une d6finition
unique.' 1
To turn next to the theory of consideration, we are forced to
admit that if to-day it has attained in most common-law jurisdic-
tions a tolerable degree of precision, there have been. periods in
its history when its outlines were ill-defined. The idea that a
moral consideration would uphold an assumpsit obtained a certain
acceptance in decisions of the end of the eighteenth century and
the beginning of the nineteenth. Moral consideration, if it means
anything, means at all events a moral duty to perform, antecedent
to, and independent of, the promise of performance. Thus lim-
ited, it seems to imply the duty to remunerate a past service
whether moved or not moved by a previous request. 'The French
writers recognise such a duty as constituting a cause. If we
admit that it constitutes 'consideration' the identification is car-
ried still further. But the identification stops short of the pure
Marcel Planiol, Traiti MeNmentaire de droit civil, t. 2, § 1035. Planiol
attributes the invention of the theory of cause to Domat, whose "Loix
civiles" was published in 1689, sed quaere.
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gratuity-the contrat be bienfaisance. In English law such a
contract has never been actionable unless under seal. It may be,
however, that the vague idea of moral consideration, which for
English law received its quietus in Eastwood v. Kenyon,' having'
found its way into the law of the Province of Quebec has been
perpetuated in our system and has made it easier for us to speak
of "cause or consideration" as if the two words were different
names for the same thing. Perhaps we shall find that the har-
monious association in our Code of two distinct ideas of contract
reflects and continues a phase of thought which in England and
most other common law jurisdictions has become merely matter
of history.
I turn now to the doctrine and jurisprudence of the Province
of Quebec. By doctrine is meant the views of the writers of
text-books. By jurisprudence is meant decided cases. It is
necessary to premise that in Civil law jurisdictions these two
sources are equally valuable or valueless. Neither makes law.
The one and only interpreter of law is reason. So far as the
doctrine or jurisprudence is reasonable we may suppose that in a
concrete case it will commend itself to the reason of the court.
Decided cases, however, have this superiority to doctrine, that if
they are uniform and continuous they make custom, and through
custom law. This is the 'rerum perpetuo similiter judicatarum
auctoritas' of the civilians.' I have stated the theory. In prac-
tice, the decisions of a court of superior jurisdiction necessarily
carry more weight than the speculations of a commentator.
Amongst commentaries upon the Civil Code of the Province,
the works of Mr. P. B. Mignault and of Mr. Justice Langelier
hold first rank. On the question which occupies us these authors
are in exact agreement. "Ii me reste," says Prof. Mignault,
"une observation i faire. Nos articles parlent de la consid6r-
ation, ce qui me parait 6tre un anglicisme et remplace mal A propos
le mot cause qu'emploie le code Napoleon et que nous trouvons
dans nos articles 982 et 984. Cette derniere expression est non
seulement la seule qui soit fran~aise, mais aussi la seule, qui soit
juridique. Je m'en servirai exclusivement."4  Prof. Mignault
then proceeds to expound the French doctrine of cause, adopting
without change the language of Mourlon's Repetitions &rites sur
le code civil, upon which his own treatise is based. Mr. Justice
I (i84o) ii A. & E. 438.
'Dig. 1. 3.38.
'Mignault, Droit civil Canadien, vol. 5, p. 20o, note (a).
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Langelier follows the same method of interpretation.' The
theory of cause is explained and illustrated. The theory of
consideration is not even mentioned.
With very great respect for these learned and lucid writers, I
cannot accept their solution as satisfactory. They resolve the
difficulty of interpretation by ignoring its existence. The Civil
Code speaks not of cause merely, but in art. 984 of 'cause or
consideration,' and in arts. 989-9o of consideration alone. The
first is a term of art in the law of France. The second is a term
of art in the law of England. Prima facie there seems to be no
reason why we should recur to the one of these systems rather
than to the other. The fact above adverted to, that the codifiers
do not cite any English authorities for these articles, is not con-
clusive, for the Roman and French authorities cited do not
explain the use of the word consideration along with or in sub-
stitution for cause. If we are to depend upon the Code alone or
upon its commentators the issue of cause v. consideration seems
likely to remain undetermined.
Perhaps a better way will be to resort to the decisions of the
courts before and after codification. For the pre-codification
period little assistance is given by the reports. The two cases to
which I shall refer do not carry us farther back than the years
immediately preceding codification. They may, however, for that
very reason have a certain value as illustrating the then state of
the law.
In Easton v. Easton6 the plaintiffs by their declaration prayed
that the defendants miht be condemned to execute a deed of
ratification of a certain deed of donation. The property donated
was at the time of donation subject to an outstanding life-interest
or usufruct; and the donors by the said deed of donation bound
and obliged themselves to ratify, confirm and renew the donation
within eight days of the death of the usufructuary. This, though
duly required, they failed and neglected to do. Defendant
demurred . . . . "because no cause or consideration was alleged
as having been given by plaintiffs to this defendant entitling them
to the ratification claimed by the action; such promise was there-
fore a nudum, pactum and could not be enforced .by law." The
court was of opinion that as the original deed of donation was
valid the promise to ratify the same was binding.
Langeller, Cours de droit civil, vol. 3, pp. 362-3.
6 (1863) 7 L. C. J. 138.
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The case of Colvile v. Flanagan7 decided nothing pertinent
to our enquiry, and is only referred to in connection with the
argument put forward by one of the parties that "both in our
own and in the English law a moral obligation is a good consider-
ation for a promise to pay." Reference is made to Lee v. Mug-
geridge,8 and to Woodbridge v. Spooner,' but not to the later case
of Eastwood v. Kenyon.10 The respondent's case then states:-
"The appellants in this case plead no consideration given for the
check, and it is not pretended on the respondent's part that actual
pecuniary value was given, although he had been in the habit of
performing friendly services which in another would probably
have been remunerated in money. The consideration is suffi-
ciently shown in the words with which the check was handed to
Mr. H. for the respondent, 'Mr. Flanagan has been very useful
to me and most discreet in everything he has undertaken. I wish
to make him an acknowledgement of my obligation to him."'
These two cases, both decided immediately before the publica-
tion of the Code, if they do not help us much, point at all events
to the conclusion that counsel at that time approached-the question
of 'cause or consideration' rather from the point of view of
'consideration' than from the point of view of 'cause.'
Coming to more recent times we have in 1894 the case of
Scanlan vs. Smith, 1 which came before the Superior Court in
Review. This was an action against executors for arrears of an
annuity alleged to be due under a contract made by their testator.
Plaintiff was testator's sister-in-law. Being left badly off on her
husband's death she proposed to keep a boarding-house as a
means of livelihood, and leased a house for the purpose. Tes-
tator, who was a wealthy man, expressed his disapproval, and
persuaded plaintiff to abandon her project, promising her an
annual pension of $2oo. His ijlotive was found to be "his large
fortune, the humiliation of seeing his sister-in-law reduced to
gaining a livelihood by such means, while he was well able to
provide for her, and finally a promise made to his dying brother
to care for the widow." In this state of facts the court held that
there was an obligation having a legal cause (obligation ayant
ne cause 16gale) and pronounced for the plaintiff. In what the
(1864) 8 L. C. J. 225.
' (1813) 5 Taunt. 36.
'(1819) 3 B. & ALd. 233.
"(i84o) ii A. & E. 438.
uR. J. Q. 6 C. S. 58.
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cause consisted is not stated, but there is no indication that the
court found it in the evident detriment to the promisee.
In BrulM v. Brul 1M 2 action was brought upon a promissory note
made by defendant in favor of his sister. The evidence estab-
lished that the note was made in fulfilment of a promise given
by defendant to his dying father. Payment was resisted on the
ground that the transaction was in effect a gift mortis causa made
by the father, and invalidly constituted. The court rejected this
view and found "qu'au contraire ce billet n'est que la reconnais-
sance d'une obligation librement contract~e par le d~fendeur en
faveur de sa soeur, fille mineure, pour lui venir en aide, i la mort
de son p~re; obligation justifi~e par les avantages que le
d6fendeur avait regus ant~rieurement de son pere par preference
sur la dite soeur, qui se trouvait reduite A l'indigence." It
will be noticed that though there may have been an
antecedent moral duty to provide for the sister, there was
no antecedent obligation to her. The promise was made to
the father. The consideration (if any) moved from the father.
We have not to do here, it must be remembered, with the
vague generalities of the Civil Code, but with the more pre-
cise language of a Dominion Statute. By the Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 53, valuable consideration for a bill [or note] may be
constituted by-(a) any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract; (b) an antecedent debt or liability. It has been
argued that this section has introduced the English law of con-
sideration into Quebec quoad negotiable instruments. Certainly
it is difficult to see how a statute of general application can take
its color, chameleon-like, from its environment, so that the same
word 'consideration' should carry one meaning in Quebec,
another in the common law provinces. On the other hand the
corresponding section of the British Bills of Exchange Act is
said to leave untouched the rule of the Scottish law that valuable
consideration is not necessary to support an obligation. Per-
haps we may take it, then, that the words 'any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract' mean, when applied to
Quebec, 'any consideration judged sufficient by the law of
Quebec.'
But even if this be so, the statute compels the Quebec lawyer,
who is apt to live in a rather nebulous atmosphere of moral con-
sideration, to distinguish in relation to bills and notes between
" (9o4) R. J. Q. 26 C. S. 77.
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present consideration, and antecedent debt or liability. He must
elect between the two. Now in the case before us it does not
appear that the brother owed any antecedent debt or liability
(understand legal debt or liability) to his sister. There was no
existing relation between them which could have given rise to
legal process. The note therefore can only be upheld, if at all,
on the ground of a consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. But this too seems to be wanting. It may possibly
consist in the moral duty (if such there was) to provide for the
sister, rendered more stringent, it may be said, by the promise
to the father, and by the fact that the son had enjoyed advan-
tages in preference to his sister. If this is our law, we seem to
go the full length of, and perhaps even beyond, the doctrine of
moral consideration, as stated by Mansfield, C. J. and Gibbs, J.
in Lee v. Muggeridge. The doubt must occur, however, whether
it is the proper business of a court of law to assume the office
of a court of conscience.
Another case which raises the same doubt is Corbett v.
Murray.1 3 A son had embezzled funds. The father gave prom-
issory notes to cover the amount of his defalcations. The court
found that there was no agreement to compromise the crime, and
further, that there was consideration for the note in the father's
moral duty to indemnify the employer.
In the later case of Legris v. C/4nj,14 a father on his death-bed
gave two checks to his son. The father died on October 3oth.
The checks were presented for payment on October 3ist. Pay-
ment was refused for want of funds. The court held that there
was no valid gift of the checks, but allowed the plaintiff to recover
the amount of the checks from the representatives of the
deceased. How an action could be maintained upon the checks
is not very apparent, for they must have been invalidated by the
death of the drawer. The case for the plaintiff was that at the
instance of his father he had bought land, and contracted with a
builder for the construction of a house upon it, the father under-
taking to be answerable for the cost. A clearer case of detri-
ment to the promisee could scarcely be found. The court did
not, however, decide for the plaintiff on this, ground, but on the
ground of moral duty. "Ces cheques n'ont pas 6t6 donn6s sans
consideration. C'6tait un devoir de conscience pour Ch6n6 pare
9 (go) 7 R. J. 203.
"(1914) R. J. Q. 23 K. B. 571.
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de s'acquitter de l'engagement qu'il avait contract6. Ces cheques
6taient donc validement causes."
Perhaps nothing brings the necessity of consideration into
clearer relief than a promise to keep an offer open. E. g., A in
writing offers to sell his house to B and adds "the offer to be
left open until Friday, 9 A. m."15 Here there are two offers;
i, an offer to sell; 2, an offer not to withdraw the offer to sell.
In English law, if the second offer is accepted, and there is a
sufficient consideration moving from the promisee, there results
a contract to which the courts will give effect, with the conse-
quence that A is answerable in damages if he withdraws his offer
to sell. In French Canadian law the result will be the same if
the second offer is accepted, and there is a 'lawful cause or con-
sideration.' In a business community such cause or considera-
tion is most likely to consist in some value given or promised by
the offeree to the offeror to compensate him for foregoing for
a time his chance of sale in the open market. In the recent case
of Cox v. Clendenning"8 Cox wrote to Clendenning, "I, the
undersigned, give W. Clendenning or any other person assigned
by him, the option on subdivision Nos. 84 and 85, fronting on
Bagg Avenue, as per official lot No. 642 of the plan of the parish
of S. Laurent, for the amount of $5oo payable on the passation
of the deed of sale. This option to expire May 3o, I912." Next
day, Cox withdrew his offer. Clendenning refused to admit the
withdrawal, and purported to accept within the time limited.
Clendenning sued for specific performance. The court (Archi-
bald, A. C. J., and Greenshields and Mercier, JJ., dissenting) had
little difficulty in dismissing the action on the ground that there
had never been an agreement to sell, and therefore, no contract
which could be specifically enforced. The learned Chief Justice
said that "the contract broken is not a contract to sell, but a con-
tract to wait so that the purchaser might have the chance to buy."
Such a contract was not susceptible of specific enforcement and a
breach of it resulted only in damages. But further, it was ques-
tionable whether there ever was a binding contract between the
parties. His Lordship continued: "I have discussed this case on
the assumption that the option in question did form a contract
between the parties; but I might add that so far as this particular
case is concerned, there was no undertaking of any description
'As in Dickinson v. Dodds, (1876) L. R. 2 Ch. D. 463.
" i95) R. 3. Q. 49 C S. 71.
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on the part of the plaintiff even to attempt to sell the prop-
erty, . . . It looks to me exceedingly like a case where one of
the essential elemerits of a contract fails, viz., the consideration."
There is nothing in this with which a common-lawyer could dis-
agree. Nor, seemingly, would the result be different in a system
of law which demanded merely cause. At its lowest valuation
that much-abused term supposes at least an intention to benefit the
promisee, but to suppose any such intention in a real-estate trans-
action, except as the equivalent of some advantage to the
promisor, is plainly absurd.
From the above decisions and a few others, one may construct
such a theory of consideration as one will. As explained above,
the decisions are not authoritative, but they are, at all events, as
authoritative as text-books. From neither source does one obtain
a critical examination of the law in force in the Province of
Quebec. It is not very easy to establish anything definite. The
French teaching of cause is completely nebulous; the English
theory of consideration, when allowed to include moral consider-
ation, is scarcely less so. As between the two we see the decisions
of our courts inclining now to one, now to the other in accordance
with the predilections of the court for one or other doctrine. If
the Supreme Court of Canada were called upon to decide between
them, one may suppose that it would favor a solution which in
such an important matter would minimize the difference between
the law of Quebec and that of the other provinces. If the ques-
tion went in appeal to the judicial Committee of His Majesty's
Privy Council-that splendid and imperial tribunal, which views
all systems of law with the same impartial aloofness-one might
with even more assurance expect the same result. If under all
reserves I may express my own opinion, gathered from the juris-
prudence of the courts, it is as follows: I do not think our law
enforces a merely gratuitous promise. The so-called contrat de
bienfaisance finds no place in our Code, and is not at home in our
system. On the other hand, the 'cause or consideration' of
the Civil Code is not identical with consideration as now inter-
preted by the English courts. In common with some of the
states of the Union we still admit that moral consideration will,
in certain cases, support a promise. What 'moral consideration'
imports is hard to say. It extends to services rendered by the
promisee, whether moved or not by a previous request. In some
cases it has been taken to include any antecedent moral duty to
the promisee, e. g., the duty to support an indigent sister or to
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make amends for a son's defalcations. But the content of a
notion so essentially vague, eludes definition. Another point
which emerges is that in its more normal applications consider-
ation presents itself to our minds rather as advantage to the
promisor than as detriment to the promisee. If in a concrete case
the latter element seems more conspicuous than the former the
promise is likely to be upheld, not so much on this ground, as on
the ground of moral duty. Finally, it is pertinent to observe
that the extremely elastic conceptions of civil liability favored by
our system admit of applications which are foreign to the com-
mon law, at all events as it exists at present. Thus, if I make
to you a statement or express an intention upon which you are
intended to act, and upon which you do act to your detriment,
it is said that an action lies upon the "delictual fault," i. e., in
tort and not in contract. If this is so, the necessity for consider-
ation of any kind seems to disappear. But to enter upon this
subject lies outside the scope of this article.
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